longer met its interests and had been imposed on it during a moment of temporary weakness. (Asmus, 2010, p. 7) Hindsight has clearly confounded this view somewhat. While the exact catalysts for the conflict will long remain hotly debated, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's reputation has suffered significantly as the view that he provoked Russian intervention rather than vice versa has gained currency (particularly in Europe). More widely, the United States-Russia 'reset' has involved a marked change of climate and de-escalation of rhetoric. Russia itself has focused increasingly on internal modernisation and immediate fears that it was to pursue overt annexation of other contested regions like Crimea and Transnistria have receded. Finally, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev's modernisation rhetoric is associated with increased efforts to control domestic nationalist excesses via greater law enforcement (Kozhevnikova, 2010) .
So what did the ' five-day war' between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 reveal about the influence of nationalism on Russian foreign policy? Was it the driving force in Russian conduct during the conflict, as some Western analysts initially assumed, and if so, why has it apparently diminished in official foreign policy discourse since 2008? Does nationalism present a significant obstacle to the 'modernisation' and 'resetting' of Russian policy?
In this chapter I will trace the foreign policy influence of Russian nationalism from the Putin to the Medvedev eras, focusing specifically on Russian nationalist arguments for and reactions to the August 2008 conflict. Although this is not the primary focus here, it should of course be noted that 'nationalism' is not the sole preserve of the Russian authorities (Western and particularly Georgian approaches also regularly articulate policies that non-natives could regard as 'nationalist'). Moreover contrary to a prevalent view that has regarded Russian nationalism as inevitably expansionist and militarist, I do not consider it as negative by itself (Pipes, 1984) . Indeed, I will argue that traditionally, Russian nationalism has rarely affected foreign policy directly or in an aggressive way; rather, the causative arrows need to be reversed. The Russian state has generally tried to insulate itself from the constrictive effects of ideational factors and -particularly in the Putin era -sought to exploit nationalism as a tool largely for domestic mobilisation purposes. However, this mobilisation of domestic nationalism -whereby nationalism is now the 'politically correct' domestic discourse -which was largely unchecked until 2008, has risked becoming self-fulfilling, creating demands that are increasingly hard to control and which spill
